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Abstract
A network effect is introduced taking into account competition, cooperation and
mixed-type interaction amongst agents along a generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra
model. It is also argued that the presence of a “market capacity” enforces an in-
dubious limit on the agent’s size growth. The state stability of triadic agents, i.e.,
the most basic network plaquette, is investigated analytically for possible scenarios,
through a fixed point analysis. It is discovered that: (i) “market” demand is only
satisfied for full competition when one agent monopolizes the market; (ii) growth
of agent size is encouraged in full cooperation; (iii) collaboration amongst agents
to compete against one single agent may result in the disappearance of this sin-
gle agent out of the market, and (iv) cooperating with two “rivals” may become a
growth strategy for an intelligent agent.
1 INTRODUCTION
Complex Networks and Multi-Agent Systems, are very active fields of research. They
entail the study of networks of interacting agents whose structure is irregular, complex
and dynamically evolving with time [1–4]. Most real systems in biology, chemistry,
engineering, socioeconomics, are made up of millions and millions of interacting agents
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(i.e atoms, electrons, people as the case may be) which account for fluctuations in the
overall behaviour of the system. Over the years, it has also been discovered that non-
linear mathematical models replicate the dynamics of real systems better than the linear
ones [5,6]. An example of such former models is the Lotka-Volterra model [7,8], and its
generalisation [9–19], which is also known as the prey-predator model [20].
The Lotka-Volterra model has been used in various ways to model complex systems
[9–16]. For instance, in [12], the model was used in e-commerce web sites in a competitive
scenario to explore its effects and the characteristic of “rich gets richer” on Internet
economy, and the “winner-takes-all” phenomenon. This was an improvement on [13,14]
where interacting agents where discovered to be “sharing the market”. The Verhulst-
Lotka-Volterra model was generalized in [17] through the introduction of a non-linear,
symmetric interaction function, used to investigate a competitive scenario. This resulted
in a self-organising clustering of agents, which were either chaotic or/and non chaotic
in nature as a result of their dependence on the agent’s size and their initial state
conditions. Cooperative scenarios examined in [18] were modeled individually without
imposing any “market condition”. This resulted in the growth of different clusters of
interacting agents beyond their capacity in contrast to the competitive case. A complex
network representation of the competitive and the cooperative scenarios was presented
in [19], in order to give another description of some generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra
model.
This present paper offers new insights on the effects of competitive and/or cooperative
interaction in a multi-agent system when n agents have some common resources to share
in the “market”.
The main contribution of our paper is two folds: firstly, we generalize the Verhulst-
Lotka-Volterra model by introducing a network effect through an undirected but weighted
graph. The weights suitably represent competition or cooperation. The elements of the
resulting adjacency matrix replaces the strength parameter in the interaction function
of the [17,18] model in order to enable a mixed-type of interactions, i.e., having a system
in which competitive and cooperative scenarios are considered to occur simultaneously
amongst the various interacting agents.
Secondly, we introduce a market capacity in the model to replace individual agent’s
capacity: this is a realistic constraint, i.e., the maximum level which all the agents may
reach in the market, like in Verhulst model of limited population growth [22,23]- thereby
enforcing a natural (endogenous) limit on agent’s size growth.
Such competition, cooperation and mixed-type of interactions are analyzed below
for triad interacting agents through the evaluation of the eigenvalues of the relevant
Jacobian matrix computed at corresponding fixed points, in order to investigate the
system stability. This triad system has been chosen as the most simple yet complex
enough as representative of basic networks [21]. Notice that the model goes well away
for the 2-player prisoner (dilemma) game.
Thus, a mixed-type of interactions between agents, made possible through the net-
work effect in the generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model, markedly differs from pre-
vious works [17–19], and seems more realistic.
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This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the generalized Verhulst-Lotka-
Volterra model is discussed. Section 3 contains the outline of the mathematical model
used in this paper. The fixed point analysis and state stability are investigated in
Section 4. In Section 5, initial size conditions and convergence to a steady state of the
triad interacting agents are further illustrated through simulations. We demonstrate the
presence of growth and/or decay effects in various scenarios, - sometimes rather complex,
but a posteriori understandable. The paper is concluded in Section 6. It appears that
the model is suitable for describing not only an “economic market” but other agent
based cases such as co-autorship, or more generally team working, or any other small or
large network based complex systems.
2 THE GENERALIZED VERHULST-LOTKA-
VOLTERRA MODEL
A generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra Model introduced in [17] is given by:
s˙i = αisi(βi − si)−
∑
i 6=j
γ(si, sj)sisj, i = 1, . . . , n, (2.1)
where si is the size of agent i such that 0 ≤ si ≤ 1; s˙i is its time derivative; αi is agent’s
growth rate if no interaction is present, βi is the agent’s maximum capacity and γ(si, sj)
is the interaction function. The first term is a Verhulst-like term [22,23] and the others
stem from the Lotka-Volterra model [7, 8].
The interaction function γ(si, sj) is defined by
γ(si, sj) = K exp
[
−
(
si − sj
σ
)2]
; (2.2)
it is a continuously differentiable function that allows a proper theoretical analysis of the
system dynamics leading to conclusions which will appear to be likely model independent.
The positive parameter σ controls or scales the intensity of agent size similarity and the
parameter K determines the scenarios of agent’s interaction.
The model is used in [17] to analyze a system of n agents in competition for some
common resources with competition becoming more aggressive between agents with sim-
ilar size. This is because as |si − sj| → 0, the interaction function γ(si, sj) → K for a
constant parameter σ, its maximum value. The competition weakens when agents have
distinctly different sizes, thereby suggesting a peer-to-peer competition modelling.
For the peer-to-peer interaction system, presented in [17, 18], a strength parameter
K was introduced: K > 0 was considered to show the presence of competition in the
market, while K < 0 implied cooperation. Under the cooperative scenario, the interac-
tion function is defined in the interval −K < γ(si, sj) < 0. In order to avoid complexity
and instability of the system, the value of K was chosen carefully through fixed point
analysis of agents with equal sizes [18], whose eigenvalues are
λ1,...,n =
K − 1
1 + (n − 1)K
, (2.3)
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so that, the K range interval − 1
n−1 < K < 0 ensures the stability of the system.
3 THE MODEL
This paper is a study of the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model when competition and coop-
eration can occur between linked agents. The market capacity β becomes the amount
of product/service sales that could be reached within a certain period of time by any
agents in the “market” [24]. The relationship between the individual agent’s maximum
capacity βi and β is given by:
βi = β −
∑
i 6=j
sj , (3.1)
so that the initial Verhulst-Lokta-Volterra model becomes:
αisi(βi − si) = αisi
(
β −
∑
i=1
si
)
. (3.2)
In addition, interaction among agents is introduced and modeled by a matrix K with
elements kij = kji, which are zero on the diagonal, and can be +1 or -1 off the diagonal.
Thus, the interaction function becomes:
γ(si, sj) = kij exp
[
−
(
si − sj
σ
)2]
(3.3)
with 0 < γ(si, sj) < |kij |.
This matrix K is the adjacency matrix of a network represented by a weighted and
undirected graph. The weights are 0,−1 and +1 indicate no interaction, cooperation
and competition respectively. Furthermore, we assume that there is no loop, that is, an
agent cannot compete or cooperate with herself. For some special matrices K, we obtain
the model in [17,18]. For instance, when
K≡


0 1 . . 1
1 0 . 1
. . .
. . .
1 1 . . 0


we obtain the full competitive scenario as in [17]. For
K≡


0 −1 . . −1
−1 0 . −1
. . .
. . .
−1 −1 . . 0


,
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this is the full cooperative scenario [18]. In addition the network matrix
K≡


0 k12 . . k1n
k21 0 . k2n
. . .
. . .
kn1 kn2 . . 0


ensures a mixed-type of interaction amongst the agents in the model, when kij(= kji)
takes the value +1 or -1. That is, when competition and cooperation occur simultane-
ously amongst interacting agents in the system. For example, for n = 3, in our model,
we can have two agents collaborating in order to compete effectively with the third
agent. This can be compared with the case of two small companies collaborating to
compete against a big company which had previously monopolized the market or when
two political parties merge together for the purpose of winning over a ruling (or over a
potentially ruling) party in an election or when scientific teams or authors cooperate on
some research topics.
Thus suppose that there exist n agents sharing some common resources. Let us
assume that agents increase in size if they acquire some portion of the resources or have
their size reduced if any market portion is lost. Our mathematical model is defined by
an n-dimensional differential equation:
s˙i = αisi
(
β −
n∑
i=1
si
)
−
∑
i 6=j
kij exp
[
−
(
si − sj
σ
)2]
sisj, i = 1, . . . , n (3.4)
where si is the agent size such that 0 < si ≤ 1; s˙ is its time derivative; αi is the
growth rate of agent i if no interaction is present; β is the market capacity and kij is the
element of the network matrix K which determines the interaction between agent i and
j. The interaction function γ(si, sj) is composed of dynamic parameters that result from
the difference between agents in relation; the parameter σ is a positive parameter that
regulates the difference in the agent’s size. Note that while K indicates what interaction
is present, σ determines the “range” of interaction of the agents. Indeed, in contrast to
the “large” interaction between equal size agents, the intensity of interactions between
“agents with bigger market share” and “those with small market share” occurs to be
weak, since as | si − sj |→ ∞, the interaction function γ(si, sj) → 0; on the contrary,
indeed, as | si − sj |→ 0, γ(si, sj) → ±1 depending on kij , which signifies a strong
interaction between agents with similar sizes.
For the sake of simplicity, without much losing generality, it can be assumed that
the agents have the same dynamic properties αi = 1, while the market capacity can be
β = 1. Therefore, equation (3.4) becomes:
s˙i = si
(
1−
n∑
i=1
si
)
−
∑
i 6=j
kij exp
[
−
(
si − sj
σ
)2]
sisj, i = 1, . . . , n (3.5)
where, as stated earlier, kij, i, j = 1, . . . , n are elements of the interaction matrix K.
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4 FIXED POINT ANALYSIS AND STABILITY
In this section, the fixed point analysis of the model is done in order to investigate the
stability of the system for all scenarios. A triad system of agent (i.e. n = 3) was chosen
as a simple yet complex representative of a basic network, in order to illustrate some of
the properties of the model analytically.
Suppose A1, A2 and A3 are triad interacting agents with market sizes s1, s2 and s3
respectively, from equations (3.3) the system of triads becomes:
s˙1 = s1(1− s1 − s2 − s3)− k12 exp
−
(
s1−s2
σ
)
2
s1s2 − k13 exp
−
(
s1−s3
σ
)
2
s1s3, (4.1)
s˙2 = s2(1− s1 − s2 − s3)− k12 exp
−
(
s2−s1
σ
)2
s2s1 − k23 exp
−
(
s2−s3
σ
)2
s2s3, (4.2)
s˙3 = s3(1− s1 − s2 − s3)− k13 exp
−
(
s3−s1
σ
)2
s3s1 − k23 exp
−
(
s3−s2
σ
)2
s3s2. (4.3)
The possible K-matrices for describing the different scenarios of interaction amongst
the agents A1, A2 and A3 are:
K1=


0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0

,K2=


0 1 1
1 0 −1
1 −1 0

,K3=


0 −1 −1
−1 0 1
−1 1 0

,K4=


0 −1 −1
−1 0 −1
−1 −1 0


where K1 represents the matrix for a full competitive system with three interacting
agents; K2 is a matrix for mixed-type of interaction system, where one agent compete
with two other agents in cooperation. In this case, agent A1 competes with agent A2 and
agent A3 which are in cooperation. K3 is a matrix for mixed-type of interaction system,
where one agent cooperates with two other agents in competition, in this case, agent A1
cooperates with agent A2 and agent A3 which are in competition with each other. K4
represents the matrix for a full cooperative system amongst the three interacting agents.
It can be observed that other cases of the mixed-type of interaction are isomorphic to
the ones here presented.
The fixed point analysis of the system entails the evaluation of the eigenvalues of
the relevant Jacobian matrix computed at each corresponding fixed point, thus used
to determine the stability of the system. When the real part of all the eigenvalues is
negative, the system is said to be stable. If at least one eigenvalue has a positive real
part, the system is unstable.
4.1 Fully Competitive and Fully Cooperative Scenario
In this paragraph, the stability of the system under either the fully competitive or fully
cooperative scenarios is discussed, that is, the model with network matrix K1 and K4.
By definition, a fixed point is a point in the phase space where all the time derivatives
are zero, i.e., s˙i = 0 for i = 1 . . . , n. The following fixed points were detected analytically
from equations (4.1)- (4.3):
(I) si = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. i.e. all agents with zero size.
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(II) si = 1 and sj = 0 for every i 6= j i.e. one agent monopolizes the market.
(III) si = b for i = 1, 2, 3, 0 < b ≤ 1. i.e. all agents own an equal share of the market.
Moreover it can be easily shown that the elements of the Jacobian matrix of the
triads are:
[J ](i,k) =
∂s˙i
∂sk
=


1− 2si −
∑
i 6=j sj
(
1 + γ(si, sj)
[
1− 2
σ2
si(si − sj)
])
, for k = i;
−si − siγ(si, sk)
[
1− 2
σ2
sk(si − sk)
]
, for k 6= i,
from which the stability conditions are to be found at each fixed point.
Type (I) Fixed Point
The type (I) fixed point analysis is the case in which all agents have size zero, i.e., si = 0
for i = 1, 2, 3. The evaluated Jacobian matrix at the type (I) fixed point, is given by:
J =

 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1


whose eigenvalues are all equal to 1 (i.e., λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 1). Therefore, it is an unstable
fixed point. At this fixed point, competition or cooperation is not applicable since all
agents are at level zero. In other words, these results do not depend on the network
matrix K.
Type (II) Fixed Point
The type (II) fixed point analysis corresponds to the case in which one agent eventually
monopolizes the market and satisfies the whole demand (i.e., s1 = 1); all others have
size zero (i.e., s2 = s3 = 0). Evaluating the Jacobian matrix at the type (II) fixed point,
we obtain:
J =

 −1 −1− φ12 −1− φ130 −φ12 0
0 0 −φ13

 ,
where φij = kij exp(−σ
−2), for i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j. The eigenvalues are obtained
from
(−1− λ)(−φ12 − λ)(−φ13 − λ) = 0
which implies that λ1 = −1, λ2 = −φ12 and λ3 = −φ13.
In the fully competitive scenario, all kij = 1 for i 6= j, thereby resulting to an all
negative eigenvalues of J. Indeed, this implies stability of the system at this fixed point.
This is applicable in real systems: if an agent monopolises the competitive market, the
agent will ensure that such a domination is not lost, whence keeping the market stable.
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On the contrary, in the fully cooperative scenario, λ2 and λ3 are positive, since all
kij = −1, i 6= j, thereby making the system unstable. This is also realistic, since in
cooperation, the ultimate goal is the maximisation of all agents gain in the market.
Therefore, it can be emphasized that monopoly and cooperation are not compatible
terms. This accounts for systemic instability.
In conclusion, the type (II) fixed point is stable in a full competitive scenario because
of the possibility of monopoly, but is unstable under full cooperation.
Type (III) Fixed Point
The type (III) fixed point analysis is the case in which all agents are eventually owning
the same share of the market, i.e., si = b for i = 1, 2, 3, 0 < b < 1. When evaluating
the Jacobian matrix at this fixed point, the constant b has first to be calculated by
substituting si = b and s˙i = 0 into Equations (4.1)-(4.3). From (4.1), it can be deduced
that:
0 = b(1− 3b)− (k12 + k13)b
2 (4.4)
= 1− b(3 + (k12 + k13). (4.5)
Therefore,
b =
1
(3 + (k12 + k13))
. (4.6)
Similarly from (4.2) and (4.3) respectively, the following is obtained:
b =
1
(3 + (k12 + k23))
. (4.7)
b =
1
(3 + (k13 + k23))
. (4.8)
Therefore, from equations (4.6)-(4.8), it can be deduced that in a fully competitive
system (i.e. k12 = k13 = k23 = 1), the agent size is b =
1
5 . This implies that the aggregate
size of the three agents does not reach the market maximum possible capacity, which
may be the negative result of the competition amongst peers.
Thus, for a full competition of agents with the same size, the Jacobian matrix with
b = 15 is:
J =
1
5

 −1 −2 −2−2 −1 −2
−2 −2 −1

 ,
the eigenvalues are obtained from the characteristic polynomial
(−1− λ)3 − 12(−1 − λ)− 16 = 0
The solution to the above cubic equation is λ1 = λ2 = 1 and λ3 = −5. This shows
that the system is unstable at this fixed point. When all the agents have an equal size in
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a competitive market, the system will be unstable; because the major goal of each agent
is to individually dominate the market. According to the model, agents with “similar”
sizes are strongly interacting; this leads to a “survival of the fittest” scenario in such a
competitive system, - thereby making the system unstable.
In contrast, for a cooperative system (i.e. k12 = k13 = k23 = −1), we have b = 1,
that is, collaboration makes all agents reach the market full capacity with agent sizes as
a function of time possibly intersecting one another.
The corresponding Jacobian matrix for the cooperative system with b = 1 is:
J =

 −1 0 00 −1 0
0 0 −1

 ;
the eigenvalues are obtained from the equation:
(−1− λ)3 = 0
which implies that the system is stable, since λ1,2,3 = −1. When all the agents with
quasi equal market share cooperate, with the collective goal of maximizing their profit
(size) in the market, the system will definitely be stable; their goal will be achieved since
the strongest possible interaction exists amongst agents with similar sizes.
It can be noted that when b = 13 , (i.e. k12 = k13 = k23 = 0), there exists no
interaction amongst the triads agents of equal sizes and this leads to the case whereby
the agents “share the market” equally.
In conclusion to this section, a summary of the fixed point analysis of our model with
the network matrix K1 and K4, i.e, under the fully competitive and fully cooperative
scenarios is presented in Table 4.1. In this table, it is shown that systemic stability is
observed under full competitive scenario only when one agent monopolizes the market,
but under the fully cooperative scenario, stability occurs only when all the agents own
an equal share of the market.
4.2 Mixed Interaction Scenario
For the mixed interaction system of triads, two possible cases can be considered; accord-
ing to the number of cooperation pairs the other cases can be easily found isomorphic
to these, i.e.,
• G2: Agent A1 is competing both with agent A2 and agent A3, these two being
in one cooperation scheme, i.e., the model with network matrix K2. This implies
that in equations (4.1)-(4.3), k12 = 1, k13 = 1 and k23 = −1.
• G3: Agent A1 cooperated with both agent A2 and agent A3, but these two are
in competition, i.e., the model with network matrix K3. Therefore, k12 = −1,
k13 = −1 and k23 = 1 for equations (4.1)-(4.3).
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Fixed Point Analysis and Stability
Scenario (I.) si = 0 ∀i (II.) si = 1, sj = 0, i 6= j (III.) si = b ∀i
Full Competition
λ1 = 1 λ1 = −1 λ1 = 1
λ2 = 1 λ2 = −φ12 λ2 = 1
λ3 = 1 λ3 = −φ13 λ3 = −5
Unstable Stable Unstable
Full Cooperation
λ1 = 1 λ1 = −1 λ1 = −1
λ2 = 1 λ2 = −φ12 λ2 = −1
λ3 = 1 λ3 = −φ13 λ3 = −1
Unstable Unstable Stable
Table 1: Summary of analytical results under Full Competition and Full Cooperation
with φij = kij exp(−σ
−2) and kij = ±1 depending on interaction between agent i and j.
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the four scenarios. An edge with solid line signifies a
competitive interaction while an edge with dashed line signifies a cooperative interaction.
Pictures respectively refers to: (a) G1, (b) G2, (c) G3 and (d) G4
Analytically, only one fixed point was detected for the mixed interaction of triad agents
which is a case of market duopoly. The coordinates of the fixed points are given by:
si = 1, sj = 1, sk = 0, for some i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, indeed, i.e. outlining the case of duopoly
in a mixed interaction market.
Fixed point Analysis
For the fixed point analysis of the two possible mixed interaction scenarios, the Jacobian
matrix is given by:
J =

 −2− k12 −1− k12 −1− φ13−1− k12 −2− k12 −1− φ23
0 0 −1− φ13 − φ23

 , (4.9)
where φij = kij exp(−σ
−2) and i, j = 1, 2, 3 for i 6= j. Considering the two possible cases
of the mixed interaction scenarios, two different Jacobian matrices emerge depending on
the values of each kij . When one agent competes with two other agents, themselves in
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cooperation, k12 = 1, k13 = 1 and k23 = −1 which after substitution into (4.9) leads to
the Jacobian matrix
J =

 −3 −2 −1− φ13−2 −3 −1− φ23
0 0 −1− φ13 − φ23

 .
Solving the characteristic equation
(−1− φ13 − φ23 − λ)[(−λ− 3)
2 − 4] = 0
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix is obtained to be λ1 = −5, λ2 = λ3 = −1. This
signifies systemic stability under the first case of mixed interaction scenarios with the
network matrix K2.
When one agent cooperates with two other agents themselves in competition with
each other, k12 = −1, k13 = −1 and k23 = 1; substitution into (4.9) implies that the
Jacobian matrix is:
J =

 −1 0 −1− φ130 −1 −1− φ23
0 0 −1− φ13 − φ23

 .
The corresponding eigenvalues obtained from
(−1− φ13 − φ23 − λ)[(−1− λ)
2] = 0.
is λ1,2,3 = −1. Hence, for the fixed point analysis under second possible case of mixed
interaction scenario with a network matrix K3 in our model, stability is observed in the
system.
In conclusion of this section, for the two types of mixed interactions amongst triad
agents, systemic stability is observed; this further shows the relevance of examining the
co-existence of competition and cooperation amongst agents in the market.
5 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present results from numerical simulations emphasizing the initial con-
ditions and the convertgence of triad agent sets for all interesting and possible scenarios,
for each network matrix type K = {K1,K2,K3,K4}.
For the sake of clarity, in Fig 1, the four possible scenarios are illustrated through
undirected graphs with three vertices representing agents A1, A2 and A3 and three edges
which signify the type of interaction amongst the agents. An edge with solid line signifies
a competitive interaction while an edge with dashed lines signifies a cooperative interac-
tion. Therefore, it can be deduced that in Fig 1, graphG1 represents the full competitive
scenario, G2 represents the first case of the mixed-interactive scenario in which agent A1
competes with A2 and A3, themselves in cooperation. Graph G3 represents the second
case of the mixed-interactive scenario in which agent A1 cooperates with A2 and A3,
themselves in competition and G4 represents the full cooperative scenario.
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time
si
ze
s
100 101 102 103
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
agent 1
agent 2
agent 3
time
si
ze
s
100 101 102 103 104
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
agent 1
agent 2
agent 3
Figure 2: Fully Competitive Scenario (G1) with different (lhs) and similar (rhs) agent’s
initial sizes.
We have tested different sets of initial conditions; see a few exemplary cases in Table
5.4. We have verified the coherence of results. This suggested to us to present only cases
when the initial conditions of agents sizes are rather different or quite similar, assuming
a constant parameter that controls the size similarity, σ = 1. The dynamic change in
agent’s size and relative behavior have been observed for each scenario. Finally, note
that agent’s sizes initial conditions were chosen within a small interval in order to allow
some “meaningful” interaction amongst the agents; since within our model, indeed, as
| si − sj |→ ∞, the interaction function γ(si, sj)→ 0.
5.1 Fully Competitive Scenario (G1)
The fully competitive scenario with different initial conditions for the agent’s size is
observed in Fig 2 with a consideration on dynamical change in the agent size; the market
eventually ends in a monopoly. For all the permutations of the initial conditions, the
agent that starts with the highest initial size, i.e s0 = 0.4, eventually monopolizes the
market by attaining the market capacity, while the other two agents fade out of the
market. This is possible because the two agents with smaller sizes compete too weakly
with the agent that eventually dominates the market.
On the contrary, when agents sizes are similar in Fig 2, the competition becomes very
“fierce” and all agents are struggling for their survival in the market. After some time
span, it is observed that the agents eventually have an equal share of the market; their
total market share is however lower than the market capacity. Thus, strong competition
among peers is shown to lead to a reduction in the aggregate output due to the selfish
interest of the individual agents. Indeed, observe that the final state (
∑
si = 0.6).
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time
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Figure 3: Fully Cooperative Scenario (G4) with different (lhs) and similar (rhs) agent’s
sizes.
Convergence is generally slower in the competitive scenario when compared with the
other scenarios due to the nature and effect of competition amongst the interacting
agents.
5.2 Fully Cooperative Scenario (G4)
The fully cooperative scenario (G4) is analyzed for different initial sizes of the triads and
illustrated in Fig 3. The cooperation amongst the agents enables all agents to grow in
size up to this market capacity, thereby increasing the total market size, - which is the
essence of cooperation (
∑
si > 1.0). A simple analogy can be drawn with the case of
publishing research in journals with a demand of just three papers in a journal edition
(i.e. market capacity). For simplicity, let it be assumed that the three authors have
the same quality standard (i.e. initial condition), under full competition, each author
will have one article published making up three papers. However, the “best” situation
occurs under full cooperation when each author cooperates in writing the articles; they
eventually have three papers each published to their credit. Hence, the final result will
be three papers for the editor and three papers for each author. One other example
pertains to car owners who may own more than one car, e.g., three cars from three
different manufacturers. These simple examples show that the agent’s sizes can intersect
each other during full cooperation.
The simulation leads to the same effect, even if the initial conditions are permuted
amongst the triads and when the agents have similar initial sizes as shown in Fig 3.
Also, agents tend to ”quickly agree”, thereby converging within a short time lapse.
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Figure 4: Mixed Interaction Scenario (G2), A1 competes with A2 and A3 in pair
cooperation, for different initial sizes.
5.3 The single pair cooperation (G2).
The mixed interaction scenario (G2), when agent A1 competes with agents A2 and A3
themselves in cooperation is shown in Fig 4 - Fig 5 for different permuted initial condi-
tions of agent’s sizes. It can be observed that in all simulations, the sizes of agents A2
and A3 in cooperation grow dynamically with time up to the market capacity but agent
A1 decreases in size until it fades out of the market. The most interesting simulation is
seen in Fig 5, with different initial conditions s0 = {0.4, 0.2, 0.1} where agent A1 initially
possesses the biggest share of the market with s1 = 0.4, competes with the two other
agents A2 and A3 that alternate a smaller size 0.1 and 0.2. Note that the sum of the two
initial shares of the cooperating agents is lower than the share of the competing agents.
Interestingly, after some time, the collaboration between agents A2 and A3 knocks out
agent A1 from the market. An example of this scenario was experienced in 2015 in the
Nigerian political history, where a political party that ruled the country for 16 years af-
ter democracy was restored, was defeated in a tight competition between the incumbent
president and an aspirant that emerged from a strategic collaboration of three smaller
political parties [25]. However, this is not possible if the intensity of interactions is very
low amongst the agents; that is, when A1 is “extremely bigger” in size when compared
to agents A2 and A3.
When all the agents have similar initial conditions, the pattern is similar with agents
A2 and A3 totally taking over the market by growing up to the market capacity as seen
in Fig 5.
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Figure 5: Mixed Interaction Scenario (G2): A1 competes with A2 and A3 in a pair
cooperation, for different (lhs) or similar (rhs) initial sizes.
5.4 The double pair cooperation (G3)
Finally, the second possible case of mixed interaction scenario (G3) is shown in Fig 6
- Fig 7; agent A1 cooperates with agents A2 and A3 themselves in competition, for
different permuted initial conditions of agent’s sizes.
When agent A1 cooperates strongly with the agent with a higher initial condition
and cooperates weakly with the other one. The effect of cooperation makes agent A1 (ir-
respective of its initial condition) and any one of the two agents that cooperates strongly
with agent A1 grows up to the market capacity, while the effect of weak cooperation and
competition between agents A2 and A3 makes the agent with the lowest initial condition
vanishing from the market.
Surprisingly, when the three agents have the same initial size, the simulation turns
out interesting also, as seen in Fig 7, - unlike the first case of mixed interaction. When
agent A1 cooperates strongly with agents A2 and A3 which are in strong competition
with each other, the effect of this strong and opposite interaction in the system results
in a final state in which no agent is attaining the market capacity, but each agent
nevertheless grows above its initial size; all three agents remained active in the market.
A summary of the simulations of the triad interaction agents is presented in Table
1. The characteristic values pertain to agent’s size initial conditions, final size and the
time of convergence. It can be observed that convergence is slower during competition,
due to the conflicting interests of interacting agents; in contrast, during cooperation,
agents tend to “agree”, thereby converging within a shorter time lapse. For the mixed
interaction cases, when agent A1 competes with agents A2 and A3 in cooperation, a
scenario with two collaborating agents in conflict with one, the time of convergence is
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Figure 6: Mixed Interaction Scenario (G3), A1 cooperates with A2 and A3 in competition
for different initial sizes.
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Figure 7: Mixed Interaction Scenario(G3), A1 cooperates with A2 and A3 in competition
for different (lhs) or similar (rhs) initial sizes.
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seen to be faster than when agent A1 cooperates with agents A2 and A3 in competition:
this can be understood due to the collaborative effect of mixed interactions being higher
in the first case than in the second case.
5.5 Emphasis on the Double pair Cooperation Scenario (G3) with Non-
smooth Evolutions
In conclusion of this simulation results section, we would like to further emphasize the two
most interesting cases G3 and G4, from a qualitative point of view in this subsection, and
for a practical point of view, considering a time scale reasoning, in the next subsection,
5.6.
It can be usually noticed that the size evolution is rather smooth, - in fact remember-
ing the (positive or negative) logistic behavior found from Verhulst equation. However,
it is worth emphasizing that the double pair cooperation (G3) can lead to a non-smooth
evolution; see Fig 7. Observe the figure with different initial sizes, in particular, the
evolution of agent A2 which starts with the lowest initial size. Its size first increases,
but reaches a maximum; thereafter, due to the cooperation of agent A1 and agent A3,
agent A2 is removed from the market, - even though agent A1 (which started with the
biggest size) cooperates with agent A2. In fine, A1 “prefers to cooperate” with A3, - and
eliminate agent A2, because A1 and A3, starting in the most advantageous positions.
This situation does not need to be explicitly illustrated with many practical cases; it
occurs of course in economic markets, like when two top soda companies (Coca-Cola and
Pepsi-Cola, sorry for such a publicity) wish to control a country market. The same occurs
in scientific competition: a well known case of war between (USA) famous laboratories
occurred after the discovery of the high Tc superconducting ceramics [30]. In sport,
cooperation (within theoretical competition) in order to win a race leads to temporary
cooperation; see cyclism races [31,32] or sumo wrestling [33] competitions. Competition
AND cooperation between political parties in order to form a coalition have already been
mentioned.
The other interesting case is found when all agents start with same sizes in Fig. 7.
They all start to grow, but the two competing agents with each other, agent A2 and
agent A3, loose their impetus to agent A1 however cooperating with both of them. In
this case, agent A2 and agent A3 are not removed from the market, but only reach some
level yet above their initial size. Of course, in so doing, agent A1 does not reach the full
market capacity.
This “bumpy behavior” is reminiscent of the behavior found when, in Verhulst equa-
tion, the growth rate and/or the capacity are/is time dependent [26]. Such a mapping
into time dependent extensions of the parameters in Verhulst equation is of course out-
side the aim of the present paper and is left for further work.
5.6 Time scale effects
Even though qualitative aspects of cooperation/competition behavior seem well de-
scribed, it seems of interest to discuss whether the control parameters of the size evolution
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are reasonable. First recall that α in Eq.(2.1) was chosen to be equal to 1. This growth
rate parameter takes values of the order of 0.04 yr−1 for steady populations, like in USA,
e.g., in the last century. Indeed, one could estimate that the possible bearing time of a
woman was about 25 years, and during that time she would bear one child who would
be surviving. Therefore in a strict Verhulst model, the rise in (population) size, going
roughly from 0 to 1 on the size axis, and from 1 to 10, on the simulation scale time axis,
according to all the presented figures, proposes a growth rate ≃ 1/10, - thus roughly
twice as large as in reality.
It is easy to observe that the time scale due to the competition parameter is rather
measured through the ratio α/kij ; see Eq.(3.4). Since we have assumed for simplicity
that kij ∼ K, the previous reasoning holds, leading to a convincingly reasonable value
of K ≃ 1 for most cooperation/competition scenarios in real life. It seems reasonable
to consider that the simulation scale is measured in usual time spans: years to hours.
From the various examples that we have pointed out as applications, it is obvious that
the cooperation/competition mixed cases occur over different time horizons, - whence
scaling the various kij strengths.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model for competition and cooperation was
extended through the introduction of some notion hereby called “market capacity”, in
place of the individual agent’s own capacity, thereby imposing a limit on agent’s size
growth. This improves previous studies in which agent’s capacity are modeled individu-
ally, - studies which resulted in agents unrealistically growing above their capacity in a
fully cooperative scenario.
Furthermore, a network effect is introduced through undirected and weighted graphs,
which enable a mixed-type interactive scenario, i.e., competitive and cooperative scenar-
ios, amongst the agents.
The present model has emphasized the basic plaquette of a network, a triad system;
it was chosen as a simple yet complex representative of any network through which some
properties of the model can be investigated analytically. In addition to this, through
simulations, dynamic changes in the agent’s size and relative behavior are observed, for
all (4 possible) scenarios.
We have emphasized that the initial relative sizes of agents is very relevant for the
evolution of the system, leading to market sharing, or sometimes removal of agents form
the “market”. Interesting scenarios occur even if the initial size of agents are similar.
When the initial sizes are quite different, the steady is of course more quickly reached.
We have emphasized that in some scenarios, a non smooth behavior can be found. The
influence of initial conditions on the co-evolution of networks has been in this respect
pointed out in [29].
We consider that the model allows to describe the evolution of various types of agents,
and is a basis for investigating more complex networks. We have pointed practical cases
of interest throughout the text; recall co-authorship behavior in scientific publications,
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political manipulations along democratic lines, the cases of sport in which individuals
from different teams can cooperate against rivals and reach a better status, in so doing.
As pointed out by Porter: “The presence of multiple rivals and strong incentives influ-
ences the intensity of competition among firms/agents; yet, competition and cooperation
can coexist because they are on different dimensions or because cooperation at some levels
is part of winning the competition at other levels”.
Other examples where the model can be useful may be found, beside general aspects
[35], in econophysics, like when there is cooperation in financial or food price speculation
[36], in auction collusions [37], or in practical economic life, e.g. when two companies
decide to tie up over the introduction of autonomous driving taxi [38].
Notice that cooperation can also be corruption [33], but can also be used to resist
speculation. The case of false, i.e. misleading cooperation could also be interestingly
considered, but needs further work, data, and debate.
We have provided a discussion pertaining to the possible time scales and their mea-
sure in order to give some reasonable range for the parameters of the model.
A final warning: it must be noticed that the interactions are time independent and
occur only amongst agents with size similarities.
Beside including time dependence of the interaction parameters, external field effects,
memory [39] and learning [40] effects could be included in further studies. Moreover, the
simultaneous up-dating might be challenged for a sequential up-dating in order to find
more complex behaviors. In particular, we have pointed out that destruction of agents
may occur; in contrast network growth can allow for creation of agents. This is relevant to
observe our extension of the basic VLV modeling: the most interesting difference between
agent-based herding model and Lotka-Volterra model is the possibility of investigating
systems with a variable number of agents.
Finally, asymmetric interactions, e.g. removing the constraint due to the square of
the exponential in Eq.(2.2) would be highly interesting. Can it be in fine pointed out
that the above matrices could be asymmetric, thus sometimes, with complex eigenval-
ues [21], whence possibly cyclic behaviors. Indeed, so called alternating and cut-off ways
of cooperation can be envisaged [41]. Many developments and much work are obviously
ahead.
Acknowledgements
This work is part of activities in COST ACTION TD1210 and in COST Action TD1306,
both being gratefully acknowledged for easing networking. In particular MA has bene-
fited of the STSM-TD1306-33054. Comments by R. Grassi are appreciated.
19
References
[1] R. Albert and A.-L. Baraba´si, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 47 (2002).
[2] A.-L. Baraba´si, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What
It Means (Perseus, Cambridge, 2002).
[3] S. Boccaletti, Phys. Rep. 424, 175 (2006).
[4] J. Kwapien´ and S. Droz˙dz˙, Phys. Rep. 515, 115 (2012).
[5] R. Hilborn, Chaos and Nonlinear Dynamics: An Introduction for Scientist and En-
gineers (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).
[6] S. Strogatz, Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos: With Applications to Physics, Biology,
Chemistry, and Engineering, Studies in Nonlinearity (Westview Press, Boulder, CO,
2014).
[7] A. Lotka, Elements of Physical Biology (Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, 1925).
[8] V. Volterra, Mem. R. Accad. Naz. dei Lincei VI, 2, 31 (1926).
[9] C. Comesa, Procedia Economics and Finance 3, 251 (2012).
[10] J. C. Sprott, Phys. Lett. A 325, 329 (2004).
[11] J. A. Vano, J. C. Wildenberg, M. B. Anderson, J. K. Noel, and J. C. Sprott,
Nonlinearity 19, 2391 (2006).
[12] L. Yanhui and Z. Siming, Appl. Math. Model. 31, 912 (2007).
[13] S. M. Maurer and B. A. Huberman, J. Econ. Dyn. Contr. 27, 2195 (2003).
[14] L. A. Adamic and B. A. Huberman, Quat. J. Electron. Comm. 1, 5 (2000).
[15] N. K. Vitanov, Z. I. Dimitrova, M. Ausloos, Physica A 389, 4970 (2010).
[16] N. K. Vitanov, M. Ausloos, and G. Rotundo, Adv. Compl. Syst., 15, Suppl.1
1250049 (2012).
[17] L. Caram, C. Caiafa, A. N. Proto, and M. Ausloos, Physica A 389, 2628 (2010).
[18] L. Caram, C. Caiafa, M. Ausloos, and A. N. Proto, Phys. Rev. E 92, 022805 (2015).
[19] L. F. Caram, C. F. Caiafa, and A. N. Proto, Atti della Accademia Peloritana dei
Pericolanti 92, S1, B2 (2014).
[20] A. Pe¸kalski, Comp. Sci. Eng. 6, 62 (2004).
[21] G. Rotundo and M. Ausloos, Eur. Phys. J. B 86, 1 (2013).
20
[22] P. F. Verhulst, Nouv. Me´moires de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sci. et Belles-Lettres de
Bruxelles 18, 14 (1845).
[23] P. F. Verhulst, Me´moires de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sci., des Lettres et des Beaux-
Arts de Belgique 20, 1 (1847).
[24] D. Grundey, I. Knyviene˙, and S. Girdzijauskas, Technological and Economic Devel-
opment of Economy 4, 690 (2010).
[25] A. Durotoye, Eur. Scient. J., 11, 169 (2015).
[26] M. Ausloos, Int. J. Comput. Anticip. Syst. 30, 15 (2014).
[27] E.W. Montroll and W.W. Badger, Introduction to Quantitative Aspects of Social
Phenomena (Gordon and Breach, New York, 1974).
[28] W.H. Press and F.J. Dyson, PNAS 109, 10409 (2012).
[29] R. Lambiotte and J. C. Gonzalves-Avela, Physica A 390, 392 (2011).
[30] R. M. Hazen, The Breakthrough: The Race for the Superconductor (Summit Books,
New York, 1988).
[31] E. Albert, Sociology of Sport Journal 8, 341 (1991).
[32] B. Hoenigman, E. Bradley, and A. Lim, Complexity 17, 39 (2011).
[33] M. Duggan and S. D. Levitt, Nat. Bur. Econ. Res., working paper N 7798.
[34] M. E. Porter, Economy, Economic Development Quarterly 14, 15 (2000).
[35] L.E. Mitchell, The Speculation Economy: How Finance Triumphed Over Industry
(Berrett-Koehler Publ., San Francisco, 2007).
[36] A. Chowdury, Economic and political weekly 46, (2011).
[37] R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan, American Economic Review 92 , 579 (1992).
[38] http : //www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2016/06/388−207094.html
[39] M. Rosvall, A.V. Esquivel, A. Lancichinetti, J.D. West, and R. Lambiotte, Nature
Communications 5, (2014).
[40] A. Lipowski, K. Gontarek, and M. Ausloos, Physica A 388, 1849 (2009).
[41] T.R. Kaplan and B.J. Ruffle, The Economic Journal 122, 1042 (2012).
21
Scenario Initial Sizes si(0) Growth (+) / Decay (-)
Full Competition G1
0.1 0.2 0.4 - - +
0.1 0.4 0.2 - + -
1
2
3
0.4 0.1 0.2 + - -
0.4 0.2 0.1 + - -
0.2 0.4 0.1 - + -
0.2 0.1 0.4 - - +
0.15 0.15 0.15 + + +
0.3 0.3 0.3 - - -
Mixed Interaction G2
0.1 0.2 0.4 - + +
0.1 0.4 0.2 - + +
1
2
3
0.4 0.1 0.2 - + +
0.4 0.2 0.1 - + +
0.2 0.4 0.1 - + +
0.2 0.1 0.4 - + +
0.15 0.15 0.15 - + +
0.3 0.3 0.3 - + +
Mixed Interaction G3
0.1 0.2 0.4 + - +
0.1 0.4 0.2 + + -
1
2
3
0.4 0.1 0.2 + - +
0.4 0.2 0.1 + + -
0.2 0.4 0.1 + + -
0.2 0.1 0.4 + - +
0.15 0.15 0.15 + + +
0.3 0.3 0.3 + - -
Full Cooperation G4
0.1 0.2 0.4 + + +
0.1 0.4 0.2 + + +
1
2
3
0.4 0.1 0.2 + + +
0.4 0.2 0.1 + + +
0.2 0.4 0.1 + + +
0.2 0.4 0.1 + + +
0.15 0.15 0.15 + + +
0.3 0.3 0.3 + + +
Table 2: Summary of the effect of initial size conditions for the various scenarios as
obtained from simulations, i.e. changing the relative initial sizes of the agents
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